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BRUCE L A N G T R Y *  
Hume's  Enquiry, Section X, Part I, may be seen as consisting, 
firstly, of a discussion of principles for evaluating testimony to the 
extraordinary and marvellous; and secondly, of an application of the 
results of that discussion to the evaluation of testimony to the 
miraculous. 
The conclusion of the first stage of the discussion is as follows: 
"Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endea- 
yours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; 
in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits 
of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more 
or less unusual . . . When the fact attested is such a one as has 
seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two 
experiments; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its 
force goes, and the inferior can only operate on the mind by the 
force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which 
gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, 
gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the 
fact which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction 
there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of 
belief and authority. ''1 
The tasks of interpretation and assessment are very much bound 
up together. One rendering of the first sentence would be as follows: 
the degree to which a piece of testimony supports the hypothesis that 
an E-type event occurred is directly proportional to the frequency 
with which E-type events have occurred in the past. However, the 
second sentence quoted, and indeed the whole way Hume has de- 
veloped the argument earlier in the section, suggests that the import- 
ant thing is the frequency with which E-type events have been 
observed to have occurred in the past. Moreover, the present render- 
ing makes it hard to understand Hume's  supposition three paragraphs 
later that "the testimony considered apart and in itself amounts to 
an entire proof". 
An improved version would be: the measure of confidence which 
one should have in the hypothesis that an E-type event occurred is 
'::University of Sydney. 
l D. Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. S. A. Selby- 
Bigge (second edition, Oxford 1902), page 113. 
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proportional not only to the degree to which that hypothesis is sup- 
ported by the available testimony considered in itself, but also to 
the frequency with which E-type events have been observed in the 
past. 
Yet this would hardly be a charitable interpretation of Hume, for 
as it stands the statement is false. Suppose that following each draw 
from a pack of cards, the card drawn is returned to the pack and the 
pack reshuffled; then after a long sequence of draws we will have 
observed the ace of spades to have been drawn with a frequency of 
1/52. Before each draw is made we do have a certain degree of 
assurance against the hypothesis that the next card drawn will be the 
ace of spades m the probability is only 1/52. But this is no reason 
against believing a witness's testimony that on some particular 
occasion the card drawn was the ace of spadcs. 
It will be pointed out that before the drawing every other outcome 
was equally improbable. Thi ;  may suggest yet another formulation 
of Hume's conclusion. The measure of confidence which one should 
have in the hypothesis that an E-type event occurred in a situation 
of type S is proportional not only to the degree to which that hypo- 
thesis is supportcd by the available testimony considered in itself, but 
also to the proportion by which the frequency with which E-type 
events have been observed in situations of type S is greater or less 
than the frequencies with which cach of the various other possible 
outcomes have been observed in situations of type S. 
But this is still unsatisfactory. Suppose we are told the pack 
contains one acc of spades and 51 queens of hearts. Then we may 
still be justifi~.d in believing a normally reliable witness's testimony 
that on some particular occasion the ace of spades was drawn. 2 
If  Hume's language suggests that there is some simple multiplying or 
subtracting of probabilities, then thi: would be mistaken. It remains 
unclear how we are to render Hume's thesis in plausible form. 
There are further over-arching difficulties for the way Hume puts 
things. He speaks as if the only evidence we have for the truth of 
some generalisation is observation of instances which fall under it. 
This, of course, is mistaken. We now realise that an Indian prince 
could have theoretical evidence that water would solidify at tem- 
peratures below 273~ even though he himself had never observed 
this phenomenon, or heard reliable reports of it. In this sense it is 
false that "all probability supposes an opposition of experiments and 
2Furthermore, suppose that two witnesses disagree over whether on a 
particular occasion an ace of spades or a queen of hearts was drawn. Our 
decision is not virtually settled by the much higher antecedent probability 
of drawing a queen of hearts; it will be made on the basis o f  who had 
the better view, who is in general a more reliable observer, etc. 
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observations"; although it is true no doubt that our evidence for a 
~iven hypothesis rests on observation at some poim ~ but this is to 
say little. 
Let us not continue to press this point, but rather restate some- 
thing like Hume's position in terms of an example. Suppose that 
one group of witnesses report that all of one hundred F objects they 
have observed have been G, while another group of witnesses report 
that they have observed some other F which was not G. The question 
is whether we are to believe that there exists an F which is not G. 






R e a d " S  (x, y) > S (z, w)"  
ports w". 
The first group of witnesses report, "Fat. Gat, Fa2. Gae, Faa. 
Ga3, . . . Faloo. Ga~oo, and these were all the F objects that 
w e  s a w  ~. 
The second group of witnesses report, "Fan. ~'~ Gun" (n 100). 
Fat. Gut, Fa~. Ga._,, Fa.~. Gaa, . . . Fal~o. Gatoo. 
Fa, ) Ga,. 
Fan. ~ Ga~, ie., negation of he. 
as "x supports y more than z sup- 
The Humean view is that "all probability supposes an opposition 
of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to 
overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence propor- 
tioned to the superiority". Therefore the just conclusion will depend 
on our weighing one group of reports against the other. That is, the 
choice between h2 and h~ must be on the basis of which hypothesis 
is better supported by (more probable on) the evidence. The question 
of which hypothesis is better supported by the evidence is the question 
of which set of reports is more reliable. Therefore we are obliged to 
accept h2 rather than h.~ if and only if it is more likely that the 
second group of witnesses was mistaken in its report than that the 
first group of witnesses is mistaken. 
This argument is unsound. What is meant by saying that the first 
group of witnesses is more reliable, i.e. less likely to be mistaken 
about the truth of what they reported, is that S (wl, hi) > S (w2 h3). 
Now the Humean sees each of the two contradictory hypotheses h~ 
and h~ as being supported by one or the other of the conflicting, 
though not contrary, statements w, and we, and asks which hypo- 
thesis is better supported by that evidence-statement in its favour. 
This is the question of whether S (w~, h~) > S (wz, h.~). But 
"S (wl, he) > S (we, h~)" does not follow from "S (wl, hi) > 
S (w2, h3)". The Humean may here appeal to the fact that hi may 
support hz to a very high degree indeed; certainly, he will say, we 
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may suppose that S (h, ,  h2) > S (w., ha).3 I t  still remains the case 
that the Humean's two premises do not entail his conclusion. 
The major error in the argum,mt is due to the Humean's being 
unduly impressed by the belief that in some sense the available bodies 
of evidence are conflicting. What is important is which hypothesis is 
best confirmed by our total body of evidence. Even though wl sup- 
ports h, and hi supports h2 to a very high degree indeed, it may 
well still be the case that S (wl. w o, h,. h~) > S (wl. w.o, hr. h2), 
in which case it will be rational to believe that h~ is true. The 
argument is based upon a neglect of the inductive fallibilism which 
Hume himself taught us. 
A restatement of a Humean position: The historian is faced with a 
complex body of documents, eye-wimess accounts, etc., which he 
must sift to determine what actually happened. In evaluating the 
available testimony the historian must use his background knowledge 
of what is probable or improbable, possible or impossible. This will 
be based on both his knowledge of what has actually happened in 
similar circumstances in the past, and also indirect theoretical grounds 
for supposing that so-and-so will or would occur in such circum- 
stances. If  this background knowledge makes it more probable that 
the event did not occur than the testimony makes it probable that 
the event did occur, then we will be justified in rejecting the hypo- 
thesis that the event occurred. In cases where the alleged event is 
somehow extraordinary and marvellous, we may normally expect the 
weight of the opposing observational and theoretical evidence to be 
overwhelming. 
This reasoning is fallacious. In terms of our earlier example, the 
Humean is considering whether h2 or ha is better supported by the 
evidence. The evidence in favour of h3 is w2; the evidence in favour 
of h2 is h,, together with certain theoretical statements t. The claim 
is that an adequate reason for our accepting h2 instead of h3 is that 
S (hi. t, h o) > S (w2, ha). 4 But this last sentence is false. The 
question of which hypothesis is better supported by the evidence is 
the question of which hypothesis is better supported by our total 
evidence, namely (hi. t. we). And even if the degree to which 
S (hi. t, h2) > S (w2, ha) is very great indeed, it may still well be 
the case that S (h,. t. w2, h2) < S ( h , . t .  w2, ha). 
3Of course Hume is the last person entitled, on his own principles, to 
invoke this premise; we may treat it as an ad hnmlnem manoeuvre. 
4t plays a quite important role here, for even if the number of objects 
mentioned in hi is very large indeed, it still may well be the case that 
S(ht, h~)'~ S(w:, h,). To revert to an earlier example, "the pack contains 
one ace of spades and 51 queens of hearts" supports "the next card drawn 
is not the ace of spades" to a high degree. Yet surely you will often be 
iusdfied in regarding my testimony as supporting "the next card drawn 
is the ace of spades" to a higher degree. 
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It  is indeed the truth of this last sentence which is responsible for 
our justified giving up of well-confirmed scientific theories on the 
basis of experimental reports. When a given theory implies that a 
certain event will not occur, it may or may not be true that the 
evidence supporting this theory functions as evidence against the 
hypothesis that the event will occur :  Consider a case in which this 
is true. It will still often be the case that the evidence in question 
plus a scientist's testimony will together support the hypothesis that 
the event occurred more than they support the claim that it did not 
occur. This is so whether or not at the moment one has available a 
new theory which economically explains all one's data. I t  is apparent 
once again how extremely misleading the Humean principle, "all 
probability supposes an oppositio-] of experiments and observations", 
can be. One notes that scientists are not found to dismiss their col- 
leagues' claims to certain experimental results by saying, "The  hypo- 
thesis in question is so well supported by past experience that these 
reports must be due to repeated experimental error, fraud, or de- 
lusion." 
A Humean might reply that such practice is justified only by the 
repetition of such experimental results. But this is mistaken. In 
astronomy, certain observations may be accepted as grounds for 
abandoning a theory even though no repetition of the observation 
occurs for decades. Repeatability fares little better, for it may not 
even be empirically possible for men to repeat the observations which 
are accepted as good reasons for abandoning a theory. For example, 
suppose that the observations are of a K-type star suddenly collapsing, 
and this is the only K-type star which ever exists. 
I t  certainly is true that in assessing the available testimony the 
historian must be guided by his background knowledge of what is 
probable and improbable. But this is to say little. Hume is widely 
supposed to have established a conclusion of much greater strength 
and interest, that containcd in the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this article. I have argucd that this is not the case. 
How does this bear on Hume's views on miracles? The Enquiry, 
Section X, contains, run together, two different accounts of miracle. 
Firstly, miracle as a transgression o[ a law o[ nature by a particular 
volition o[ the Deity, or by the interposition o[ some invisible agent. 6 
Antony Flew has recently expounded thc importance of this definition. 
He points out that according to it miracles are physically impossible. 7 
But what is explicit in Flew exists, at most, only in undeveloped form 
5For "e supports h and he entails c" does not entail "e supports c". 
6Hume, op. elL, p. 115 n. 
7A. G. N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (1961), pp186f; also God 
and Philosophy (1966), pp.148f. I believe that Flew's views are incorrect; 
but this should be the argument of another paper. 
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in Hume and is not in fact central to his reasoning. Rather, Hume's  
own argument depends upon a characterisation of miracle as the limit 
case of the extraordinary and marvellous, viz., an event of such a kind 
that there is uniIorm experience "against" its occurrence. For textual 
evidence, consider Hume's  admission that "there may possibly be 
miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as 
to admit of proof from human testimony", e.g., total darkness cover- 
ing the earth for eight days in January 1600. 8 Here "miracle" and 
"violation" cannot be understood as on the first account. (One must 
content oneself with the negative point, since it is also unclear how 
the specific case falls under the second account. For Hume persuades 
himself that such an event might admit of proof only by describing 
it in such a way - -  viz., "example of corruption in nature, etc." 
that there is not a uniform experience against events of that kind.) 9 
Consider also Hume's  discussion of testimony to a dead man's being 
restored to life: " I  weigh the one miracle against the o t h e r . . ,  and 
always reject the greater miracle". I~ This is intelligible on the 
second, but not on the first account. 
Thus Humc's  reasoning concerning our knowledge of miracles may 
be set out as follows: 
(1) [Paragraph quoted at the beginning of this article.] 
(2) There is a uniform experience against every miraculous event. 
(3) Therefore there is a direct and full proof against the existence 
of any miracle; nor can such a proof bc dcstroyed, or the miracle 
rendered credible, but by an oppositc proof, which is superior; and 
even in such a case, our degree of assurance should correspond only 
to the difference in degrees of strength of the two proofs. 
(4) Testimony for miracles associated with the popular religions 
is of a kind which has often been found to be unreliable. 
(5) Thcrcforc a miracle can never be proved ,so as to be the 
foundation of a system of religion. 
The validity of this argument is open to serious objections, but 
these have not been the concern of this paper. I have argued that (1) 
is false, and have warned of the dangers of the word "against" in 
(2).  I conclude that Hume's argument for (3) ,  and so for (5) ,  is 
unsound. 
SHume, op. tit., pi27. 
9Clearly almost any event can trivially be so redescribed. This underlines 
the fact that the hypotheses to be evaluated are of the form "there 
occurred an event of type F", where "F'" is some particular predicate. 
t0Hume, op, cir., p l l6 .  
